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Introduction
MODERN TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES ARE a massive benefit to
the global economy: from Microsoft’s persistent progress in the com-
puter software market, to Google’s revolutionizing web browsing and
email, to Facebook’s seemingly colossal goal of keeping people con-
nected through innovative social media methods. It would be hard to
imagine a world without such vital mechanisms used to make transfer-
ring information faster, cheaper, and easier for businesses consumers
around the world. However, these companies face a serious problem.
Inconsistent enforcement of the United States’ Antitrust laws and the
European Union’s Competition laws substantially hinder what these
companies do best: furthering the global economy. Given the domi-
nant global nature of modern technology companies, it is essential
that a more globally cooperative body of competition law be created.
This Comment will dissect United States Antitrust law and com-
pare it with the European Union’s Competition law with the focus on
how these conflicting bodies of law negatively affect modern technol-
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ogy companies. Specifically, this Comment will analyze the effect that
these antitrust and competition laws have had on Microsoft,1 are cur-
rently having on Google,2 and could have in the future on technology
companies such as Facebook.3 Finally, this Comment will discuss the
need for more cooperation in establishing an internationally recog-
nized body of competition law4 and provide as an example a success-
ful antitrust agreement between the United States and Australian
governments.5
I. European Union Competition Law Versus United States
Antitrust Law
The pertinent European Union competition laws are found in
Article 102 (“Article 102”)6 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (“TFEU”),7 which was authored by the member
states.8 Article 102 states: “Any abuse by one or more undertakings of
a dominant position within the internal market or in a substantial part
of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so
far as it may affect trade between Member States.”9
At first glance, the European Union’s Article 102 seems quite sim-
ilar to Section 2 of the United States’ Sherman Antitrust Act (“Sher-
man Act”), which states:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopo-
lize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or
1. See infra Part III.A–B.
2. See infra Part III.C.
3. See infra Part IV.A.
4. See infra Part V.
5. See infra Part VI.
6. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 102, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47, 89 [hereinafter TFEU], available at http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:ccccda77-8ac2-4a25-8e66-a5827ecd3459.0010
.02/DOC_1&format=PDF. Article 102 was previously known as Article 82. See Consolidated
Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 82, Dec. 24, 2002, 202
O.J. (C 325) 65 (as in effect 2004) [hereinafter TEEC], available at http://www.refworld
.org/docid/3ae6b39c0.html.
7. TFEU, supra note 6, at 47.
8. See id. at 49.
9. Id. at 89 (“Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: (a) directly or indirectly im-
posing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions; (b) limiting
production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; (c) applying
dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing
them at a competitive disadvantage; (d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to
acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.”).
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with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
$100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000,
or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said pun-
ishments, in the discretion of the court.10
After all, both laws seek to stunt dominant market positions. 11 How-
ever, there are a few key differences between the laws. First, the Sher-
man Act applies to any monopolistic conduct including attempts to
monopolize as well as conspiracies to monopolize,12 whereas Article
102 proposes to govern only abuses of dominance. 13 In other words, the
Sherman Act focuses on any conduct that results in or might lead to a
monopolistic position, but Article 102 governs abusive actions taken
by a firm already in a dominant position.14 Further, while both systems
require a firm to acquire a certain level of market power to be consid-
ered dominant, § 2 usually requires a market share of over 50 percent,
while EU law only requires a market share of 38 percent before inter-
vention becomes necessary.15 Lastly, Article 102 punishes dominant
firms that negatively impact the competitive process, whether there is evi-
dence of harm to the consumer or not,16 while the Sherman Act main-
tains its focus on consumer welfare.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
11. Compare id. (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
felony . . .”), with Application of Articles 101 102 TFEU (Formerly Articles 81 and 82 of the EC
Treaty), EUROPA (Mar. 14, 2011), http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/competition/
firms/l26092_en.htm [hereinafter Application of Articles 101 102] (“In order to ensure that
the rules on competition concerning agreements, decisions of associations of undertakings
and restrictive practices (Article 101) and abuses of a dominant position (Article 102),
which are liable to be anticompetitive, are applied, the Commission has a number of pow-
ers to take decisions, to conduct investigations and to impose penalties.”).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 2.
13. Application of Articles 101 102, supra note 11.
14. See Pierre Larouche & Maarten Pieter Schinkel, Continental Drift in the Treatment of
Dominant Firms: Article 102 TFEU in Contrast to § 2 Sherman Act 3 (Amsterdam Ctr. for Law &
Econ., Working Paper No. 2013-08, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=2293141 (“With the term ‘monopolization’, § 2 would focus on how a
monopoly position is obtained or maintained, and not so much on the actions of the mo-
nopolist once that position has been achieved, whereas Article 102 would not pay attention
so much to how a dominant position has arisen, but would instead police particular abu-
sive actions of the dominant firm . . . .”).
15. Id. (“The prevailing measure for market power in both systems is market share in
the relevant market. Under EU law, a (combined) market share of 38% can be sufficient to
raise the rebuttable presumption of a dominant position, . . . whereas in the US interven-
tions based on § 2 will usually require a market share of over 50% . . . .”).
16. Id. at 7 (“When dominant firms inflict injury on the competitive process as such, this is
already sufficient to trigger the application of Article 102 TFEU, even in the absence of
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Finally, a patent holder in the United States is not required to
issue licenses that allow others to use the patented technology.17 How-
ever, in the European Union, refusing to issue licenses to use a pat-
ented technology would likely result in a violation of competition
laws.18 European Union patent holders must make a patent available
to rivals using fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms and
prices.19
Overall, the European Union’s competition laws are a more strin-
gent means of governing competition in the marketplace. The ambig-
uous nature of the law leads to a broad scope of competition
protection, which poses unique challenges for modern technology
companies seeking to comply with both legal regimes.
II. United States Antitrust Law
While there are many veins of United States Antitrust law, this
Comment will focus on the relevant laws governing the creation,
maintenance, and destruction of monopolies. A monopoly is defined
as the “exclusive ownership [of a commodity] through legal privilege,
command of supply, or concerted action.”20 The Sherman Act—
passed by Congress in 1890—sought to prohibit business practices
that may be deemed to exhibit anticompetitive behavior.21 Section 2
of the Act is most pertinent to the governing of monopolies.22
concrete evidence of consumer harm . . . [whereas] the US now has – by all accounts – a
strong focus on consumer welfare as the ultimate objective . . . .”).
17. See John Paul & Brian Kacedon, Exclusive Patent Licensees May Have Standing to Sue
for Infringement Even If Others Have the Right to License the Patent, LES INSIGHTS (Jan. 24,
2011), http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=7853c148-
f3b8-46a3-927b-8b45ec995719 (explaining that “[a] U.S. patent provides a statutory right
to exclude others from practicing the invention claimed in that patent” and thus gives the
patent holder the choice as to whether he or she wants to issue licenses for others to use
the invention or process covered by the patent).
18. See Jonathan Radcliffe, Recent Impact of EU Competition Law on Patent Strategies for
Life Sciences Companies, BLOOMBERG BNA (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.bna.com/recent-im
pact-eu-n17179872473/.
19. See id. (discussing the tension between the European Union’s competition and
patent laws).
20. Monopoly Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/diction
ary/monopoly (last visited Feb. 9, 2014).
21. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012). The Sherman Act also sought to prohibit conspiracies
resulting in restraint of trade among the several states and foreign nations. Id. § 3.
22. See id. § 2 (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if
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Although the Sherman Act prevents unlawful business practices,
its purpose is to protect consumers and the market.23 When deciding
the case of Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan,24 the Supreme Court
noted that
[t]he purpose of the [Sherman] Act is not to protect businesses
from the working of the market; it is to protect the public from the
failure of the market. The law directs itself not against conduct
which is competitive, even severely so, but against conduct which
unfairly tends to destroy competition itself.25
To enforce this purpose, the Sherman Act gives the federal govern-
ment—by way of the United States Department of Justice—the juris-
diction to prosecute violators criminally, as well as the authority to
bring civil actions.26 However, despite its ability to bring criminal ac-
tions, the Department of Justice typically chooses to initiate civil en-
forcement proceedings against those who violate the Sherman Act. 27
The Sherman Act makes unlawful three different practices: (1)
monopolization; (2) attempts to monopolize; and (3) combinations
or conspiracies to monopolize.28 If a company appears to be violating
§ 2 of the Sherman Act, the first step of the analysis is determining
whether that company possesses monopoly power in the relevant mar-
ket.29 Although there has been some inconsistency among the courts
regarding the proper method for this inquiry,30 the Supreme Court in
United States v. Grinnell Corp.31 began its analysis by defining the rele-
vant product market.32 Specifically, identification of a relevant prod-
uct market “requires identification of a specific product market in a
a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10
years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.”).
23. Id.
24. 506 U.S. 447 (1993).
25. Id. at 458.
26. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDE-
LINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1995), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/pub
lic/guidelines/internat.htm.
27. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); Spectrum
Sports, 506 U.S. 447; United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
29. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570 (1966).
30. Compare Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172,
177 (1965), with Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 570–71, Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus.,
Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 894 (10th Cir. 1991), and Deauville Corp. v. Federated Dep’t Stores,
Inc., 756 F.2d 1183, 1192 n.6 (5th Cir. 1985).
31. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
32. Id. at 570–71 (explaining that under § 2 of the Sherman Act, a monopoly offense
has two elements, the first being the possession of monopoly power in the relevant
market).
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particular geographic market.”33 In other words, a court must identify
which market the product is in with regard to competing products in
the given geographic area, and whether any market alternatives ex-
ist.34 Because ultimately, “where there are market alternatives that
buyers may readily use for their purposes, illegal monopoly does not
exist.”35 The second step of the inquiry asks whether the company
acquired market power by means of willful conduct, or by way of
“growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, busi-
ness acumen, or historic accident.”36 Essentially, there must be an
analysis of the conduct that gave rise to the allegation. If there was
questionable conduct, the court will ask whether the defendant ac-
quired or maintained a monopoly other than by superior competition
on the merits or if the company used predatory or exclusionary con-
duct in an attempt to force or keep others out of the market.37 Exclu-
sionary conduct, as explained by the circuit court in United States v.
Microsoft,38 requires that a company’s actions have an anticompetitive
effect.39 That is, the behavior “must harm the competitive process and
thereby harm consumers. In contrast, harm to one or more competitors
will not suffice.”40
III. Problems with the Current Overlap Between United
States Antitrust Law and European Union
Competition Law
Companies are not well served by conflicting antitrust and com-
petition laws because the penalties effectively destroy a company’s
33. 27 A.L.R. Fed. 762 (1976).
34. WILLIAM HOLMES & MELISSA MANGIARACINA, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 3:4
(Thomson Reuters 2013).
35. Id. (quoting United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391
(1956)).
36. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 570–71.
37. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT
UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT ch. 1 (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/
atr/public/reports/236681_chapter1.htm (“Such conduct [suitable for an antitrust viola-
tion] often is described as ‘exclusionary’ or ‘predatory’ conduct. This element includes
both conduct used to acquire a monopoly unlawfully and conduct used to maintain a mo-
nopoly unlawfully. A wide range of unilateral conduct has been challenged under section
2, and it often can be difficult to determine whether the conduct of a firm with monopoly
power is anticompetitive. Some basic boundaries are provided by the law’s requirements
that the conduct harm ‘competition itself,’ that it be ‘willful,’ and that it not be ‘competi-
tion on the merits’ . . . .”).
38. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
39. Id. at 58.
40. Id.
Winter 2014] A CASE FOR GLOBAL COOPERATION OF ENFORCEMENT 507
overall competitiveness. In addition to creating arguably unfair re-
sults, the conflict between the United States and European Union le-
gal regimes leads to problems such as lack of information sharing due
to confidentiality issues.41
In 1995, Roscoe B. Starek III42 addressed this concern in his
speech entitled “International Aspects of Antitrust Enforcement.”43
Mr. Starek spoke about guidelines that “appropriately balance a com-
mitment to prudent antitrust enforcement against considerations of
comity and other principles of international cooperation.”44 The re-
vised guidelines included the expansion of cooperation limits as well
as increased collaboration among agencies.45 Responding to those
who characterized the approach taken by the guidelines as overreach-
ing, Mr. Starek reminded them “that the government is equally com-
mitted to building bilateral and multilateral cooperation with its
trading partners.”46 In theory, the revised process for enhanced coop-
eration designed to promote information sharing should have led to
more cohesive investigations. However, almost two decades later not
much has changed, and companies are still subject to multiple investi-
gations conducted by the United States and Europe, which are not
necessarily, if at all, cooperative.47 The following sections outline the
implications this lack of cooperation has had, and continues to have,
on modern technology companies.
41. See Roscoe B. Starek, III, Former Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, International As-
pects of Antitrust Enforcement, Address at Antitrust 1996 A Conference Presented by Busi-
ness Development Associates, Inc. Washington, D.C. (Sept. 29, 1995), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1995/09/international-aspects-antitrust-enforcement
(“Business information obtained in investigations is deemed confidential under both U.S.
and EU laws, and those laws do not permit sharing of such information with foreign law
enforcement authorities.”).
42. Roscoe B. Starek is the former Commissioner of the United States Federal Trade
Commission. Roscoe B. Starek, III, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/biogra
phies/roscoe-b-starek-iii (last visited June 9, 2014).
43. See Starek, supra note 41.
44. Id.
45. See id. (“Some other points worth noting about the Act include the authority
granted to the Justice Department and the FTC to use their compulsory process tools to
obtain evidence for a foreign enforcement authority even where the matter in question
would not violate U.S. law. Another is that information obtained by criminal grand juries
may be made available to foreign enforcement authorities. Finally, although information
obtained through the U.S. premerger notification program may not be shared, the Act
does allow the FTC and the Justice Department to use their compulsory processes to obtain
information in merger cases that then can be shared with foreign authorities.”).
46. See id.
47. See James Kantor & Steve Lohr, As Europe Presses Google on Antitrust, U.S. Backs Away,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/18/technology/eu-and-
google-to-discuss-antitrust-issues.html?_r=1.
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A. United States Antitrust Law Implications for Microsoft
One of the most widely known antitrust cases is United States v.
Microsoft.48 The United States brought suit in federal court against the
tech giant for violating §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.49 Specifically,
the United States alleged that Microsoft “waged an unlawful campaign
in defense of its monopoly position in the market for operating sys-
tems designed to run on Intel-compatible personal computers
(‘PCs’).”50 The United States further asserted that Microsoft engaged
in “a series of exclusionary, anticompetitive, and predatory acts to
maintain its monopoly power.”51 The United States also argued that
Microsoft unsuccessfully attempted to monopolize the market for web
browsers.52 Lastly, the United States contended that Microsoft en-
gaged in illegal tying by bundling its browser to its operating system
and “entering into exclusive dealing arrangements” to do so.53
The district court held that Microsoft had: (1) fostered a monop-
oly in the market for Intel-compatible PC operating systems in viola-
tion of § 2; (2) attempted to gain a monopoly in the market for
Internet browsers in violation of § 2; and (3) illegally tied together
two purportedly separate products, Windows and Internet Explorer,
in violation of § 1.54 Microsoft appealed the decision to the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Colombia.55 The Court of
Appeals affirmed the first § 2 violation, reversed the second § 2 viola-
tion, and remanded the case with regard to the § 1 violation.56
In determining whether Microsoft held monopoly power within
the relevant market, the district court
defined the [relevant] market as “the licensing of all Intel-compati-
ble PC operating systems worldwide,” finding that there [were] “[ ]
no products—and . . . there [were] not likely to be any in the near
future—that a significant percentage of computer users worldwide
could substitute for [the operating systems] without incurring sub-
stantial costs.”57
48. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Max Schanzenbach, Network Effects and Anti-
trust Law: Predation, Affirmative Defenses, and the Case of U.S. v. Microsoft, 2002 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 4, ¶ 1 (2002).
49. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 45.
50. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35 (D.D.C. 2000).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 45.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 46.
57. Id. at 52.
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Microsoft argued that the District Court’s finding was incorrect be-
cause the court failed to take into consideration non-PC based operat-
ing systems, such as Mac OSX.58 However, the court of appeals held:
Microsoft neither points to evidence contradicting the District
Court’s findings nor alleges that supporting record evidence is in-
sufficient. And since Microsoft does not argue that even if we ac-
cept these findings, they do not support the District Court’s
conclusion, we have no basis for upsetting the court’s decision to
exclude Mac OSX from the relevant market.59
Microsoft posed several other arguments the court did not find per-
suasive60 and finally entered into a complex settlement agreement
with the United States.61 The settlement agreement required
Microsoft to share its application programming interfaces with third-
party companies and to appoint a technical committee with the au-
thority to
interview . . . any Microsoft personnel . . . inspect and copy any
document in the possession . . . of Microsoft personnel . . . obtain
reasonable access to any [of Microsoft’s] systems . . . obtain access
to, and inspect, any physical facility . . . and require Microsoft per-
sonnel to provide compilations of documents, data and other
information.62
B. European Union Competition Law Implications for Microsoft
In the European Union’s case against Microsoft, the European
Commission alleged the company refused to provide Sun Microsys-
tems63 with technical design information, which would have allowed
Sun to create work group server operating systems that would “seam-
lessly integrate” with Microsoft’s Windows platform.64 The commis-
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See generally id. (detailing various other arguments Microsoft posed to the court of
appeals).
61. See generally Final Judgment, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30
(D.D.C. 2000) (No. 98-1232 (CKK)), 2002 WL 32153514, available at http://www.justice
.gov/atr/cases/f200400/200457.pdf (detailing the complex terms of the settlement
agreement).
62. Id. at 11.
63. See Oracle and Sun, ORACLE, http://www.oracle.com/us/sun/index.html (last vis-
ited June 9, 2014) (“Oracle acquired Sun Microsystems in 2010, and since that time Ora-
cle’s hardware and software engineers have worked side-by-side to build fully integrated
systems and optimized solutions designed to achieve performance levels that are un-
matched in the industry.”).
64. See European Commission Decision of 24 May 2004 Relating to a Proceeding Pur-
suant to Article 82 of the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement Against
Microsoft Corporation No. 53/2007, 2007 O.J. (C 900) 23, 25 [hereinafter Article 82 Deci-
sion], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:032
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sion further stated that Microsoft’s platform was indispensible to
competitors, and by failing to provide the technical specifications,
Microsoft risked eliminating Sun from the work group server operat-
ing systems market.65 The European Union alleged that such a refusal
hindered the progress of technical development to the detriment of
consumers.66 Ultimately, by blocking others from entering the market
for work group server operating systems, Microsoft was creating an
abuse of a dominant position.67
The European Union found that Microsoft’s abuse of a dominant
position violated Article 82 (now Article 102)68 and issued a remedy
that was a bit sterner than the United States’ remedy.69 The European
Union’s decision held:
Microsoft [is ordered] to disclose the information that it had re-
fused to supply and to allow its use for the development of compat-
ible products. The disclosure order is limited to protocol
specifications, and to ensuring interoperability with the essential
features that define a typical work group network. It applies not
only to Sun, but to any undertaking that has an interest in develop-
ing products that constitute a competitive constraint to Microsoft
in the work group server operating system market. To the extent
that the Decision might require Microsoft to refrain from fully en-
forcing any of its intellectual property rights, this would be justified
by the need to put an end to the abuse.70
The European Union also required Microsoft to pay a fine of EUR
497,196,30471 or about $613 million,72 the largest fine ever imposed
by the Union for abuse of a dominant market position or participa-
tion in a cartel.73
In sum, Microsoft was considered a monopoly and was rightfully
punished for it. However, the question remains whether it was neces-
:0023:0028:EN:PDF (“Microsoft has refused to provide Sun with information enabling Sun
to design work group server operating systems that can seamlessly integrate in the ‘Active
Directory domain architecture’, a web of interrelated client PC-to-server and server-to-
server protocols that organise Windows work group networks.”).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See TEEC, supra note 6; Article 82 Decision, supra note 64, at 27.
69. See Article 82 Decision, supra note 64, at 27–28.
70. Id. at 27.
71. Id. at 28.
72. Peter Sayer, EU Fines Microsoft $613 Million, TECHHIVE (May 24, 2004), http://
www.techhive.com/article/115334/article.html.
73. Microsoft Hit by Record EU Fine, CNN (Mar. 25, 2004), http://web.archive.org/web/
20060413082435/http://www.cnn.com/2004/BUSINESS/03/24/microsoft.eu/ (“The Eu-
ropean Union has found Microsoft guilty of abusing the ‘near-monopoly’ of its Windows
PC operating system and fined it a record 497 million euros ($613 million).”).
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sary to punish Microsoft twice. Admittedly, Microsoft was punished for
different actions in each jurisdiction—i.e., bundling Internet Explorer
with Windows in the United States74 and blocking Java on Internet
Explorer in the European Union75—however both actions stemmed
from Microsoft’s antitrust violations, i.e., its attempt to monopolize or
its abuse of dominant position.76 Double punishment for antitrust vio-
lations could be avoided if there were global guidelines that compa-
nies—like Microsoft—could follow, instead of being subjected to
different standards and arguably inconsistent punishments that do
not necessarily correlate to the particular violation. Subjecting
Microsoft to multiple penalties does not properly address what is at
the heart of antitrust and competition laws; especially when such pen-
alties cumulatively dissipate a company’s competitiveness by displac-
ing its resources. These are concerns that future companies must face
and current companies are facing—namely, Google, who has been in-
vestigated by the United States Department of Justice and is currently
being investigated by the European Union.77
C. Current Implications of the Two Bodies of Law on Google’s
Search Engine
Google, a company that started in 1998 with a check written for
$100,000,78 has grown into the most used search engine79 and delivers
results for more than three billion searches per day.80 However,
Google’s tremendous growth came with increased legal scrutiny. The
following sections discuss the effects of United States antitrust and EU
competition laws on Google.
1. United States Antitrust Analysis
Over the years, Google has faced various antitrust issues ranging
from private civil suits to Department of Justice investigations.81 One
74. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35 (D.D.C. 2000).
75. See Article 82 Decision, supra note 64.
76. See id.; Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30.
77. See Google Faces New EU Antitrust Complaint, 195 ANTITRUST COUNSELOR 7 (Mar.
2011).
78. Company: Google Inc., GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/about/company/ (last vis-
ited June 9, 2014).
79. See Top Sites Global, ALEXA, http://www.alexa.com/topsites/global (last visited
June 9, 2014).
80. Soutik Biswas, Digital Indians: Ben Gomes, BBC NEWS (Sept. 9, 2013), http://www
.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-23866614.
81. See, e.g., TradeComet.com L.L.C. v. Google, Inc., 647 F.3d 472 (2d Cir. 2011);
Person v. Google, Inc., 346 F. App’x 230 (9th Cir. 2009); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Jus-
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such issue stemmed from Google’s deal with Yahoo!—“Google wanted
to serve its ads for certain search terms on Yahoo’s pages in exchange
for a share of the revenue those ads generated.”82 The proposal led
the Department of Justice to threaten an antitrust suit83—specifically,
a violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act for potentially holding monop-
oly power.84 The Department of Justice invoked § 2 to destroy Stan-
dard Oil in 1911,85 pick apart AT&T in 1982,86 and prosecute
Microsoft in 1998.87 The threat proved deadly for Google’s proposed
deal: “Google and Yahoo tried to salvage the negotiations, but on the
morning of November 5, three hours before the DOJ was going to file
its antitrust case, they abandoned the deal.”88 The deal was extin-
guished, but Google found itself still facing a possible antitrust mo-
nopoly investigation.89
As previously stated, when performing a Sherman Act § 2 analy-
sis, the relevant market of the alleged monopolizer must be deter-
mined.90 For purposes of antitrust laws, Google is categorized in the
online search and search advertising market, which includes other
providers such as Microsoft and Yahoo!.91 Thus, because Google is not
tice, Statement of the Dep’t of Justice’s Antitrust Division on Its Decision to Close Its Inves-
tigations of Google Inc.’s Acquisition of Motorola Mobility Holdings Inc. and the
Acquisitions of Certain Patents by Apple Inc., Microsoft Corp. and Research in Motion Ltd.
(Feb. 13, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/February/12-at-210
.html.
82. See Nicholas Thompson & Fred Vogelstein, The Plot to Kill Google, WIRED (Jan. 19,
2009), http://web.archive.org/web/20130702092635/http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/
magazine/17-02/ff_killgoogle?currentPage=all.
83. See id. (“Now Barnett was signaling not just that the Google-Yahoo deal was dead
but that the government saw Google as a potential monopolist. In fact, Barnett insisted, if
the deal wasn’t substantially changed or scuttled, he would sue within five days. It was a
stunning blow. Google had expected a speedy approval. Now the company, whose brand is
defined by its ‘Don’t be evil’ slogan, faced the prospect of being hauled into court on an
antitrust charge.”).
84. Id.
85. See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
86. See United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982).
87. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35 (D.D.C. 2000).
88. See Thompson & Vogelstein, supra note 82.
89. Id. (“Google isn’t out of the antitrust woods yet, either. Sanford Litvack—a gov-
ernment lawyer who would have run the DOJ’s suit against Google had it not withdrawn
the Yahoo proposal—says that, in his opinion, Google’s current position may already con-
stitute a monopoly, even without Yahoo.”).
90. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 5-18.
91. Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Google and the Limits of Antitrust: The Case
Against Google, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 194 (2011) (“A preliminary issue for assess-
ing Google’s business is determining the relevant market in which it operates. Although
colloquially it is understood that Google is the dominant search and search advertising
provider in an online search market comprised of Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo!, the anti-
Winter 2014] A CASE FOR GLOBAL COOPERATION OF ENFORCEMENT 513
the sole provider in the market for online search and search advertis-
ing, market alternatives do exist. The next inquiry under § 2 is to de-
termine whether there was a willful acquisition or maintenance of
market power.92 At the time of the proposed deal with Yahoo!, Google
was said to hold a 70 percent market share within the search advertis-
ing provider market, and Yahoo! held a 20 percent market share.93
Those opposing the deal argued that if allowed, the deal would create
a situation in which advertisers would be less able to negotiate ad
rates, which would result in advertisers paying more for ad space.94
While Google was able to circumvent monopolistic violations in the
United States by expending resources to prove that they were creating
a better product for consumers, the company is still amidst an investi-
gation in Europe based on an alleged abuse of dominance.95
2. European Union Competition Law Analysis
While it appears Google has circumvented its legal troubles in the
United States, the battle is not over abroad. 96 The search giant is
currently battling scrutiny by the European Commission.97 This battle
may prove more challenging than the prior domestic battle. Herbert
Hovenkamp, a law professor at the University of Iowa,98 distinguished
Google’s current battle in Europe from that in the United States, stat-
ing that
trust relevance of this assessment is questionable. The competitive landscape Google con-
fronts is complex, and the company plainly faces competitive threats from a range of
sources, both actual and potential; the notion of a well-cabined, ‘online search advertising
market’ is decidedly messy. The antitrust-specific question is whether this messiness is sig-
nificant enough to cast doubt, absent viable econometric data, on the antitrust relevance of
a simplified ‘online search advertising market.’ There is reason to be skeptical.”).
92. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71, (1966).
93. Thompson & Vogelstein, supra note 82 (“It went like this: Google had 70 percent
of the search advertising business, and Yahoo had 20 percent. Now those two companies
were proposing a business deal. That would give advertisers less leverage to negotiate ad
rates, and they would end up paying more.”).
94. Id.
95. See Claire Cain Miller & Mark Scott, Google Settles Its European Antitrust Case; Critics
Remain, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/06/technology/
google-reaches-tentative-antitrust-settlement-with-european-union.html?_r=0.
96. See id.; Kanter & Lohr, supra note 47.
97. See Kanter & Lohr, supra note 47 (“Joaquı´n Almunia, the competition commis-
sioner of the European Union, placed the contentions about search bias at the top of his
list of concerns about Google. And in a private meeting this month, Mr. Almunia told Jon
Leibowitz, chairman of the F.T.C., that European antitrust officials remain focused on that
issue, according to two people told of the meeting, who asked not to be identified because
they were not authorized to speak about it.”).
98. Id. (“Mr. Hovenkamp advised Google on one project, but no longer has any finan-
cial connection to the company.”).
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[i]n America, dominant companies are given great leeway, if their
conduct can be justified in the name of efficiency, thus consumer
benefit. Google has consistently maintained that it offers a neutral,
best-for-the-customer result. [However,] [i]n Europe, antitrust ex-
perts say, the law prohibits the “abuse of a dominant position,” with
the victims of the supposed abuse often being competitors. “The
Europeans tend to use competition law to level the playing field
more than is the case in the United States . . . .”99
Essentially, the European Union will not accept the efficiency argu-
ment that tends to be the focal point of United States antitrust law.100
Joaquin Almunia, the Competition Commissioner of the European
Union, is primarily concerned with Google’s method of displaying
search results.101 Specifically, Mr. Almunia states: “Google displays
links to its own vertical search services differently than it does for links
to competitors . . . [the] concern[ ] [is] that this may result in prefer-
ential treatment compared to those of competing services, which may
be hurt as a consequence.”102
Negotiations are currently in progress between the European
Union and Google, and the ultimate goal is to agree on a settle-
ment.103 If a settlement is not agreed upon, Google could face a fine
of up to 10 percent of its annual global revenue, or somewhere
around $3.79 billion.104 Despite this large penalty, there is an advan-
tage to the European Union for settling with Google105: namely,
avoiding lengthy resolution proceedings, which will ensure that any
proposed remedies remain relevant in the quickly changing technol-
ogy marketplace.106
However, even if both sides reach an agreement, Google will
once again have expended significant time, money, and effort com-
bating the investigation. Without global cooperation between agen-
cies, it is unfair to subject Google and other technology companies to
the possibility of dual enforcement by the United States and Euro-
99. Id.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. Id. (quoting Joaquı´n Almunia).
103. See id.
104. Id. (“If Mr. Almunia ultimately accepts a settlement offer, Google would avoid a
possible fine of as much as 10 percent of its annual global revenue, about $37.9 billion last
year. It would also avoid a guilty finding that could restrict its business activities in
Europe.”).
105. See id. (“A settlement would offer advantages for Mr. Almunia, too. He has sought
to speed up resolution of antitrust cases to prevent them from dragging out, particularly in
the fast-changing technology marketplace, where proposed remedies often rapidly lose
their relevance.”).
106. Id.
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pean Union antitrust laws because the duplicative punishments that
follow take away from research and development that in turn spurs
competition and benefits consumers. Some critics argue that “enforce-
ment action[s] against Google . . . create[ ] substantial risk for a false
positive which would chill innovation and competition that currently
provides immense benefits to consumers.”107
IV. Problems with Antitrust Enforcement Against Technology
Companies
Antitrust and competition laws, both in the United States and Eu-
rope, have recently shifted attention toward modern technology com-
panies.108 However, at some point the effects of this heightened
scrutiny may do more harm than good. Ronald Coase,109 a law profes-
sor and economist, warned against this issue when he commented on
antitrust law and its implications for technology:
 One important result of this preoccupation with the monopoly
problem is that if an economist finds something—a business prac-
tice of one sort or another—that he does not understand, he looks
for a monopoly explanation. And as in this field we are very igno-
rant, the number of ununderstandable practices tends to be rather
large, and the reliance on a monopoly explanation, frequent.110
Essentially, Mr. Coase is indicating that there are inherent dangers in
antitrust and competition laws.111 Often there is—incorrectly—
greater focus on whether the actual laws are being violated, and less
focus on understanding the business conducted by the entity in ques-
tion.112 It seems that a better way to determine whether antitrust and
competition laws are violated is to fully understand an entity’s busi-
ness practices prior to analyzing those business practices parallel to
the laws. This will help prevent uninformed decisions regarding anti-
trust or competition law violations by providing a landscape of the
practices within a business field. However, the current practice avoids
107. Manne & Wright, supra note 91, at 244.
108. See Steve Lohr & Miguel Helft, New Mood in Antitrust May Target Google, N.Y. TIMES,
May 17, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/18/technology/compa
nies/18antitrust.html?_r=0.
109. Mr. Ronald Coase was a Professor Emeritus of Economics at the University of Chi-
cago Law School. About Ronald Coase, RONALD COASE INSTITUTE, http://www.coase.org/
aboutronaldcoase.htm (last visited June 9, 2014).
110. Ronald Coase, Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research, 3 ECON. RESEARCH:
RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 59, 67 (1972).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 70.
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this sort of analysis and thus may leave future successful technology
companies in a precarious position.
A. United States Antitrust Implications for Facebook
If being a monopolist means possessing enough market power to
exclude competitors,113 it is debatable whether Facebook has enough
market power to be considered a monopoly. In NCAA v. Board of Re-
gents of the University of Oklahoma,114 the Supreme Court defined mar-
ket power as “the ability to raise prices above those that would be
charged in a competitive market.”115 Facebook provides a social
networking service that is free to users.116 Because the services
Facebook offers are free to the consumer,117 it is hard to argue that
the company’s existence is harmful to consumers because there are
no prices to raise or control. However, Facebook could face potential
antitrust scrutiny after its recent acquisition of WhatsApp.118 The
merger was seen as Facebook’s attempt at broadening its reach on
smartphone and tablet users by strengthening its messaging service.119
Thus, future antitrust scrutiny would likely target the “extent of com-
petition between WhatsApp’s service and Facebook’s own application,
Facebook Messenger, and [determine] whether the deal would give
Facebook undue control of the messaging market . . . .”120
Accordingly, while it may currently be difficult to discern which
of Facebook’s business practices might potentially violate antitrust
113. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 37, at ch. 2 (“The Supreme Court has de-
fined . . . monopoly power as ‘the power to control prices or exclude competition.’”)
(quoting United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956)).
114. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
115. Id. at 109 n.38.
116. See Internet Software and Services: Company Overview of Facebook, Inc., BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 9, 2014), http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/priv
ate/snapshot.asp?privcapId=20765463; Create an Account, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook
.com/help/345121355559712/ (last visited June 9, 2014) (answering, “Does it cost money
to use Facebook? Is it true that Facebook is going to charge to use the site?”).
117. Create an Account, supra note 116.
118. See David McLaughlin & Stephanie Bodoni, Facebook WhatsApp Bid Seen Avoiding
U.S. Antitrust Case, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-
02-20/facebook-s-whatsapp-deal-seen-avoiding-u-s-antitrust-challenge.html (“The FTC will
probably review the WhatsApp transaction based on the expertise acquired from earlier
reviews of Facebook’s business, said Maurice Stucke, a lawyer at GeyerGorey LLP and a law
professor at the University of Tennessee.”). Although the WhatsApp application may be
free to download, the application requires a small subscription fee after the first year of
use. FAQ: What are WhatsApp Subscription Fees?, WHATSAPP, https://www.whatsapp.com/faq/
en/general/23014681 (last visited July 12, 2014).
119. Id.
120. Id.
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laws, it might only be a matter of time before the social network giant
also finds it must answer to both the United States Department of
Justice and the European Commission.
B. European Union Competition Law Implications for Technology
Companies
Data collection might be the next way the EU seeks to enforce its
competition laws on modern technology companies.121 Companies
such as Facebook and Twitter collect personal data to provide a per-
sonalized experience for users that visit their websites.122 A positive
aspect of this data collection is that “users benefit from free, personal-
ized consumer experiences such as Internet search, social networking,
geo-referenced listings, or content distribution platforms.”123 This is
because the collection of data conveniently places the consumer’s in-
terests in one place and more accurately meets his/her needs. 124
While the European Union has not formally opened any investi-
gations to determine whether data collection might lead to a violation
of competition laws, the European Commissioner, Joaquin Almunia,
stated in a speech in November of 2012 that “today, personal data are
a type of asset for companies . . . . Companies evidently try to use their
access to personal data to gain commercial advantage vis-a`-vis users. It
is necessary to strike the right balance between regulation and compe-
tition policy enforcement.”125 Thus, while Mr. Almunia has not yet
initiated an enforcement investigation into data collection prac-
tices,126 it seems highly probabilistic. Such investigations will surely
have implications for nearly any company with a web-based pres-
ence.127 Without proper guidelines set forth and agreed upon by the
United States and Europe, these investigations could lead to further
121. See Gabrielle Accardo & Carmelo Fontana, Personal Data and Competition Law En-
forcement in the Online Environment: E.U. and U.S. Perspectives, TRANSATLANTIC TECH. L. FO-
RUM, http://www.law.stanford.edu/organizations/programs-and-centers/transatlantic-
technology-law-forum/personal-data-and-competition-law-enforcement-in-the-onlin (last
visited June 9, 2014).
122. See Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy (last vis-
ited June 9, 2014); Privacy Policy, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/privacy (last visited June 9,
2014).
123. See Accardo & Fontana, supra note 121.
124. See, e.g., Data Use Policy, supra note 122; Privacy Policy, supra note 122.
125. See Press Release, Joaquı´n Almunia, Vice President of the European Comm’n Re-
sponsible for Competition Policy, Competition and Personal Data Collection (Nov. 26,
2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-860_en.htm.
126. See id.
127. See id.
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obstacles for these companies—such as multiple investigations and
punishments—creating the need to expend valuable resources such as
time and money.
V. The Need for Global Competition Cooperation
Agreements
An internationally recognized cohesive agreement governing an-
titrust and competition laws is necessary to ensure consistency and ef-
ficiency. Companies whose business reaches outside its domestic
borders can be subject to multiple enforcement agencies, often reach-
ing very inconsistent conclusions.128 While modern global technology
companies should indeed be regulated, they should not be punished
multiple times when providing services that ultimately benefit con-
sumers and advance modern technology.129 There should be more
consistency between enforcement agencies so that it is easier for com-
panies to predict the legal scrutiny they may encounter.
Further, the United States Department of Justice has itself long
recognized the need for more consistency among antitrust agen-
cies.130 At the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (“OECD”)131 Global Forum on Competition in 2001, then
Assistant Attorney General Charles A. James132 spoke about the “ex-
plosive growth in the number of countries with antitrust laws and
agencies”133 and “the importance of cooperation among antitrust
agencies in ensuring sound antitrust enforcement in an increasingly
global marketplace . . . .”134 Mr. James discussed instances where the
128. See discussion supra Part III.A–B.
129. See discussion supra Part III.
130. See Charles A. James, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks
before the OECD Global Forum on Competition (Oct. 17, 2001) [hereinafter Remarks by
Charles A. James], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/9330.htm.
131. About the OECD, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., http://www.oecd.org/
about/ (last visited June 9, 2014).
132. Mr. Charles A. James is a former Assistant Attorney General at the Department of
Justice. Charles James (Attorney), WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_James_
(attorney) (last visited June 9, 2014); see also Remarks by Charles A. James, supra note 130.
133. See Remarks by Charles A. James, supra note 130 (“There was a time, not so many
years ago, when few countries had antitrust laws and fewer still enforced them. (Indeed—
and this strains the imagination—there was a time when there were very few international
antitrust conferences.) But during the past decade, market principles, deregulation, and
respect for competitive forces have been broadly embraced, and many countries have cre-
ated antitrust laws and agencies that are committed to enforcing them. Over 90 countries
currently have antitrust laws of some sort, and roughly 20 more countries are in the process
of drafting such laws.”).
134. See id.
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Department of Justice and the European Union have lacked cohesion,
most notably, the proposed merger between General Electric and
Honeywell.135 The Department of Justice approved the merger, while
the European Commission “blocked the transaction in its entirety”136
despite “analyzing identical product and geographic markets and hav-
ing access to the same facts” as the Department of Justice.137
The General Electric and Honeywell merger is just one example
of the unpredictability that can result from having inconsistent inter-
national standards regarding competition law. The major difference
between the United States’ and the European Union’s analysis of this
merger was that the Department of Justice focused more on the po-
tential for improved products at lower prices as a result of the merger,
while the European Union focused more on the potential for devastat-
ing effects on competitors.138
This is the crux of the problem: having to work with multiple
enforcement agencies creates huge issues.139 These issues can have
negative consequences for the companies subject to the enforcement,
as well as the consumer. For example, in the case of the proposed
merger between General Electric and Honeywell, the United States
Department of Justice concluded that “the merged firm would have
offered improved products at more attractive prices than either firm
could have offered on its own, and that the merged firm’s competitors
would then have had a great incentive to improve their own product
offerings.”140 However, after speaking with the two companies’ com-
petitors, regulators in Europe concluded that the deal would “stifle
135. See id. (“After reviewing the recent proposed $42 billion merger of General Elec-
tric and Honeywell, the Justice Department cleared the merger, while requiring divestiture
to address competitive concerns in two markets. But the European Commission, analyzing
identical product and geographic markets and having access to the same facts we did,
blocked the transaction in its entirety.”).
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id. (“When transactions are reviewed by multiple authorities, the risk of sub-
stantive and procedural conflicts can increase dramatically, and effective cooperation
among a large number of agencies can be extraordinarily difficult. On the substantive side,
the potential for inconsistent outcomes increases substantially. On the procedural side, the
burdens, costs, and uncertainties associated with filing in and dealing with a large number
of reviewing jurisdictions pose serious concerns for the international business community.
Among other things, they may discourage, unduly delay, or at best, constitute a tax on
efficient, consumer-friendly transactions. These are difficult issues that may not have easy
solutions, and certainly cannot be resolved unilaterally or through bilateral efforts
alone.”).
140. Id.
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competition,” and without communicating with the Department of
Justice, essentially squashed the deal.141 The European Union’s deci-
sion to put a stop to the merger had clear repercussions for the two
companies.142 However, the failed merger did not only affect the two
companies;143 it also affected consumers because they could not take
advantage of improved products at better prices, which in the United
States is “the very essence of competition.”144 This contradiction stems
from different agendas (i.e., protecting competitors versus protecting
consumers)145 and inconsistent enforcement standards, as well as a
lack of agency cooperation.146
The Department of Justice’s Rachel Brandenburger147 addressed
these problems in her remarks to the Law Society’s European Group
in 2010.148 She stated:
 Our aim is to intensify the Antitrust Division’s cooperative rela-
tionships with other competition agencies and to encourage our
staffs to be mindful of the international implications of our actions
right from the very start of an investigation through to the reme-
dial phase. We need to approach our work in this way because the
challenges presented by today’s global economy and multi-polar
world demand it.149
Ms. Brandenburger reiterated those assertions more recently to the
International Bar Association in 2012,150 which evidences that incon-
141. See id.
142. See Michael Elliott, The Anatomy of the GE-Honeywell Disaster, TIME (July 8, 2011),
http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,166732-1,00.html (“Honeywell
and GE were both industrial conglomerates, but their product lines had few overlaps. A
combined company, however, would be a powerful force.”).
143. See Remarks by Charles A. James, supra note 130.
144. See id.
145. See Kanter & Lohr, supra note 47.
146. See id.
147. Rachel Brandenburger is a former Special Advisor at the Department of Justice.
Archive of Speeches by Rachel Brandenburger, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/
atr/public/speeches/speech-brandenburger.html (last visited June 9, 2014).
148. Rachel Brandenburger, Special Advisor, Int’l Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Remarks as Prepared for the Law Society’s European Group: Challenges and Opportuni-
ties in International Competition Policy (Nov. 9, 2010) [hereinafter Brandenburger, Re-
marks at Challenges and Opportunities], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
speeches/272860.pdf.
149. Id. at 4.
150. Rachel Brandenburger, Special Advisor, Int’l Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Remarks as Prepared for International Bar Association Midyear Conference: The Many
Facets of International Cooperation at the Antitrust Division 2–3 (June 15, 2012), available
at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/284239.pdf (“One of our key objectives at
the Antitrust Division is to intensify our cooperative relationships and interactions with
competition agencies around the world, and to do so not just with our long-time col-
leagues, but also with newer competition agencies. We encourage Antitrust Division staff
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sistency among international entities has yet to be remedied and that
consistency remains an imperative goal.
VI. Moving Toward Change
This section discusses ideas that may be used to battle the issues
surrounding inconsistent enforcement of antitrust and competition
laws. Ms. Brandenburger’s “Seven Principles for Effective Global Com-
petition Enforcement”151 provide a solid foundation for a remedy to
the inconsistency problem between the enforcement of United States
antitrust and European Union competition laws. However, these prin-
ciples must be broken down and built upon in order to lead to effec-
tive change.152 The United States’ Antitrust Cooperation Agreement
with the Australian Government offers an example of a successful
agreement between two countries with differing laws. The seven prin-
ciples and the template for a cooperative agreement, taken together,
offer a starting point from which the United States and European
Union can develop a cooperative antitrust enforcement policy.
A. Principles for Effective Global Competition Enforcement
Ms. Brandenburger’s “Seven Principles for Effective Global Com-
petition Enforcement”153 are a good starting point for a solution to
the inconsistency problem. The principles are: (1) transparency; (2)
mindfulness of other jurisdictions’ interests; (3) respect for other ju-
risdictions’ legal, political, and economic cultures; (4) trust in each
other’s actions; (5) ongoing dialogue on all aspects of international
competition policy and enforcement; (6) cooperation; and (7) con-
vergence.154 While most of these principles have been considered in
the past,155 they must be manipulated and improved upon in order to
create a more cooperative solution to the inconsistency between
United States antitrust laws and European Union competition laws.
Several of these principles are more relevant than others in achieving
this goal.
constantly to be, ‘mindful of the international implications of our [enforcement] actions
right from the very start of an investigation through to the remedial phase.’” (alteration in
original)).
151. Brandenburger, Remarks at Challenges and Opportunities, supra note 148, at 10.
152. In the text that follows, some of the principles have been combined, altered, or
omitted so as to conform to the author’s viewpoints.
153. Brandenburger, Remarks at Challenges and Opportunities, supra note 148, at 10.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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1. Trust
Trust is essential to cooperation and is the first step toward ad-
vancing the global cooperation on competition enforcement.156 It will
require “not only improving the ways [the United States Department
of Justice] work[s] with the agencies [it] know[s] well and [is] accus-
tomed to cooperating with, but also establishing day-to-day working
relationships with an increasing number of agencies.”157 Once trust is
established, agencies will be more willing to share information with-
out fear of agency exploitation or deception and will foster mutual
respect and “facilitate inter-agency cooperation.”158 Without such a
framework, presumably, ideas will not be shared, deference for coop-
eration will diminish, and inconsistencies will thrive.
To build trust, agencies must be honest with each other about
any interests or objectives they are seeking to achieve, instead of wait-
ing until companies have been negatively impacted, at which point it
is too late. Building trust also includes maintaining integrity by doing
what is promised or even maintaining an open line of communication
when a particular situation necessitates a broken promise. With trust
comes a foundation for improving global cooperation when enforcing
competition laws.
2. Transparency
Creating a transparent situation involves open communication
between different jurisdictions’ investigative and enforcement agen-
cies.159 Ideally, increased transparency will create a situation where
agencies tasked with enforcing competition laws more efficiently
“communicate, cooperate, respect each other, or converge effectively
with one another . . . .”160 In effect, transparency will allow these agen-
cies to better understand each other’s approaches to enforcement
and cohesively present companies with a framework to follow regard-
ing potential competition law violations.161 This is important because
it will give companies insight into how rules will be applied in certain
156. See id.
157. Id. at 13.
158. Rachel Brandenburger, Special Advisor, Int’l Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Remarks as Prepared for St. Gallen International Competition Law Forum: Transatlantic
Antitrust: Past and Present 9 (May 21, 2010) [hereinafter Brandenburger, Remarks at St.
Gallen], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/260273.pdf.
159. See Brandenburger, Remarks at Challenges and Opportunities, supra note 148, at
10–11.
160. Id. at 10.
161. See id. at 10–11; Brandenburger, Remarks at St. Gallen, supra note 158, at 9.
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cases162 and perhaps lead to the end of duplicative investigative
processes and punishments. Transparency could also benefit consum-
ers by allowing companies to remain focused on improving their prod-
ucts instead of expending unplanned resources to defend against
enforcement by multiple agencies. The result would mean better
products for consumers, while technology companies are allowed to
continue advancing the global economy.
Of course simply saying that enforcement agencies should be
more transparent is much easier said than done. However, when
thinking about what might lead to increased transparency, it is note-
worthy that the process starts with cultivating and deepening the ex-
isting relationships between governmental enforcement agencies. In
other words, actually making efforts to understand the guiding princi-
ples behind each other’s actions will better allow for the cohesion that
transparency will bring. Critics may argue that the difference in over
arching principles is exactly what prevents transparency from occur-
ring in the first place. While this might be partially true, the concept
of being more transparent, in itself, does not necessarily require agen-
cies to seek the same goals with regard to protecting competition or
consumers. Instead, being more transparent will, at the very least,
bring varying concerns to the forefront, which is exactly what is
needed to begin to cooperate with one another. At that point, agen-
cies can decide the level of cooperation they feel comfortable with.
Either way, the inconsistencies in antitrust enforcement are being rec-
ognized and addressed.
3. Mindfulness and Respect for Jurisdictional Interests
Mindfulness means agencies strive to “understand the ways in
which their colleagues in other jurisdictions operate,” and also take
into account “the impact of their actions and approaches outside of
their own jurisdiction . . . .”163 Being aware of other jurisdictions’ in-
terests, in theory, requires enforcement agencies to take into careful
consideration, “the impact of their remedial options outside of their
jurisdiction . . . .”164 Additionally, by making agencies responsible for
taking into account each other’s enforcement decisions, mindfulness
will seek to put an end to overlapping remedial outcomes.165 It is real-
162. See Brandenburger, Remarks at Challenges and Opportunities, supra note 148, at
10–11.
163. Id. at 11.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 11–12.
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istic that a situation might arise requiring different approaches to en-
forcement; however, ideally the agencies would not move forward
without first considering each agency’s preferred plan of action, es-
sentially bringing the agencies closer to a more cooperative and cohe-
sive competition enforcement mechanism.
Critics might argue that being mindful of each jurisdiction’s inter-
ests is a waste of time because each government has its own set of
priorities and although being mindful might sound like a good idea, it
will simply get lost in the shuffle of those competing interests. Critics
may also argue that there is no way to measure or quantify who is
being mindful and at what level. In response to such arguments, a
framework for an initiative may be used to prevent the concept of
being mindful from getting lost in the shuffle. The framework would
be structured around an agreement requiring each member to submit
its interests and priorities with regard to competition laws and the en-
forcement of those laws. The agreement would next call for each
member to produce negatives and positives of the other member’s
submitted interests. This step would be an attempt at eliminating the
stigma that one member’s priorities are more important or should
take precedence over another’s. In effect, this process will force mem-
bers to think about why each agency goes about regulating competi-
tion differently and would in turn lead to continued mindfulness.
These submissions would be discussed at bi-annual meetings and
would be self-regulating. Thus, if one member decides to be less in-
volved, it would have to answer to the group as a whole at the next
meeting. Through this process each jurisdiction would be held per-
sonally responsible for making sure that it is not acting in a strictly
self-serving manner, but also being mindful of the interests of its fel-
low jurisdictions.
Some may argue that jurisdictions might not want to participate
or might not prioritize being mindful with regard to the enforcement
of competition law. This may be true for some, however, most jurisdic-
tions recognize the need for global cooperation when enforcing com-
petition laws—as seen through the past attempts to cooperate166—
166. See Rachel Brandenburger, Twenty Years of Transatlantic Antirust Cooperation: the
Past and the Future, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE at 1 (Oct. 14, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/atr/
public/articles/279068.pdf (“A mere 18 months passed between then-Competition Com-
missioner Sir Leon Brittan’s first public reference to ‘the desirability of a treaty or less
formal agreement’ to deal with ‘the possibility of conflicts of jurisdiction’ and the signing
of the US-EC bilateral antitrust cooperation agreement on September 23, 1991. It is not
surprising that the negotiators, including then-Assistant Attorney General Jim Rill, were
able to produce the text—which became the model for many subsequent US antitrust
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leaving the jurisdictions that choose not to participate in the minority.
Again, being mindful does not mean that each member or agency
must prioritize others’ interests, it simply means that these jurisdic-
tions would be at least cooperating with each other and moving closer
toward more effective global competition enforcement.
Being mindful might hopefully also lead to being open to the
ideas of other jurisdictions. Once jurisdictions approach each other
with an open mind, they may recognize that other agencies might
have ideas that would benefit the system as a whole.167 Diversity of
thought will spur new and creative ideas that will promote solidarity of
enforcement and allow agencies to learn from each other. However,
none of this is possible without the agencies’ initial willingness to in-
clude each other when weighing divergent outcomes.168 Respect is im-
portant to facilitating cooperation169 and thus may help to avoid
inconsistent outcomes by allowing these agencies to keep open
communications.
4. Ongoing Dialogue
Ongoing dialogue between competition agencies, as well as “with
the business community, consumers, practitioners, academics, and the
public” will ensure that “important insights and different perspectives”
are shared.170 Ideally, ongoing dialogue should also include necessary
feedback that can be used to measure the success of different ap-
proaches. Additionally, by maintaining dialogue and open communi-
cation, there will be very little surprise for companies that are targeted
for investigation. Instead, companies will know what to expect by way
of competition regulation and then may make the appropriate
changes in order to comply.
Critics might argue that maintaining necessary feedback will be
too burdensome and time consuming for agencies. However, when
balancing these costs against the negative effects of not maintaining
substantial ongoing dialogue, the decision is easy. By maintaining an
open line of communication, being receptive to constructive criticism,
and continually sharing ideas, everyone benefits.
cooperation agreements—in a relatively short time, by the standards of international nego-
tiations. This was clearly an idea whose time had come.”).
167. See id. at 12.
168. Id.
169. See Brandenburger, Remarks at St. Gallen, supra note 158, at 9.
170. See Brandenburger, Remarks at Challenges and Opportunities, supra note 148, at 14.
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5. Cooperation
As this Comment has discussed, cooperation is essential for pro-
gressing toward a more a more cohesive enforcement of competition
law. Through increasing the four previously mentioned principles,
agencies will be cooperating. Cooperation among agencies has al-
ready proven to promote consistency and efficiency171 and will be crit-
ical to properly enforce competition laws in this new age of globalized
business. While improving cooperation is not an easy task and will re-
main a work in progress, its progression is imperative to ensure the
best outcomes aimed at reducing duplicative burdens on technology
companies and providing clearer standards. When cooperating with
each other, competition agencies will be able to pool their resources
and design a system that eliminates duplicity and instead encourages
efficiency.
Some might argue that the current system works and that making
an effort toward cooperating will be wasted effort. However, it is this
author’s opinion that the current system does not work fine when
companies are inconsistently investigated and punished. The current
system stunts innovation and investment into the global market. By
cooperating with each other, agencies will maximize global efficiency
through the use of shared resources, which will again, benefit
everyone.
6. The End Goal of Convergence
Convergence refers to the intersecting of approaches used by the
different agencies.172 Ultimately, convergence will “improve the likeli-
hood that agencies get to similar answers on similar questions.”173 For
example, the United States Department of Justice and the Irish Com-
petition Authority have converged regarding cartel enforcement,174
and have produced impressive results. A survey of antitrust authorities
from forty-six jurisdictions “revealed that the agencies have achieved
increased convergence in several important areas, including the au-
171. See id. at 15 (“[W]e have seen progress on the joint negotiation of remedies in
individual transactions (most recently in Ticketmaster/Live Nation, where the Antitrust Divi-
sion and the Canadian Competition Bureau worked together to impose the same remedy
for the U.S. and Canada) . . . .”).
172. See Christine A. Varney, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks
as Prepared for the Institute of Competition Law New Frontiers of Antitrust Conference:
Coordinated Remedies: Convergence, Cooperation, and the Role of Transparency 1–2
(Feb. 15, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/255189.pdf.
173. Brandenburger, Remarks at St. Gallen, supra note 158, at 11.
174. Id. at 12.
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thorization and use of greater investigative powers to detect and prove
cartel activity, the widespread adoption and refinement of increas-
ingly effective leniency programs, and the imposition of more effec-
tive sanctions for cartel violations.”175 Thus, if properly implemented
and maintained, convergence will move agencies toward a sound anti-
trust and competition law regime.176
Convergence is a principle that may be easily attacked by critics.
However, critics must remember that this is the end goal of the pro-
cess. By building trust, creating more transparency, being mindful,
continuing ongoing dialogue, and working to cooperate with each
other globally, we will create an environment in which different ap-
proaches begin to mirror each other. Ultimately this will lead to, at
the very least, global cooperation when enforcing United States anti-
trust and European Union competition laws—especially at a time
when technology is, more than ever before, rapidly transforming and
creating a global marketplace.
B. An Example of a Cooperative Antitrust Agreement
While a great deal of the inconsistent antitrust penalties stem
from differences in substantive laws, agreements that effectively man-
age cooperation among governmental investigatory agencies do ex-
ist.177 One such agreement was made in 1982 between the
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission on behalf
of the United States Government and the Australian Government’s
Competition Enforcement Agency.178 This agreement outlined how
the agencies would cooperate on shared antitrust matters.179 The first
consideration in the agreement pertains to notification.180 Specifi-
cally, when the United States government decides to undertake an an-
titrust investigation that may have implications for the Australian
government, laws, or policies, the investigatory agency must first notify
the Australian government.181 The same notification requirement ap-
175. Id.
176. Id. at 13.
177. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Commonwealth of Australia Relating to Co-operation on Antitrust Mat-
ters, June 29, 1982, 34 U.S.T. 3888, 21 I.L.M. 702 (1982), available at http://www.justice
.gov/atr/public/international/docs/austral.us.txt.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at art. I.
181. Id. at art. I, ¶¶ 2–3.
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plies when the Australian government decides to adopt a policy that
might have implications for the United States government.182
After notification is given, the government will decide if a formal
consultation is necessary.183 During consultations, both governments
identify possible implications for either government’s body of law and
seek to avoid conflicts by “giv[ing] the fullest consideration to modify-
ing any aspect of the policy which has or might have implications . . .
to the enforcement of [either country’s] antitrust law.”184
During the notification or consultation processes, any informa-
tion exchanged “shall be treated confidentially by the receiving
[p]arty unless the providing [p]arty consents to disclosure or disclo-
sure is compelled by law.”185 Specifically, this will require the United
States government to gain consent from the Australian government
when seeking to use information obtained during the notification and
consultation stages. 186 However, this does not foreclose the United
States from “pursuing an investigation of any conduct which is the
subject of notification or consultations, or from initiating a proceed-
ing based on evidence obtained from sources other than the Govern-
ment of Australia.”187 In other words, after notification is given and a
consultation is completed, the United States may initiate a proceeding
or investigation based on information obtained from sources beyond
that which is received from the Australian Government.188
182. Id. at art. I, ¶ 1 (“When the Government of Australia has adopted a policy that it
considers may have antitrust implications for the United States, the Government of Austra-
lia may notify the Government of the United States of that policy. If practicable, such a
notification shall be given before implementation of the policy by persons or
enterprises.”).
183. Id. at art. II, ¶ 2 (“When it appears to the Government of the United States
through notification pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article 1 that a policy of the Government
of Australia may have significant antitrust implications under United States law, the Gov-
ernment of the United States shall communicate its concerns and may request consulta-
tions with the Government of Australia. The Government of Australia shall participate in
such consultations.”).
184. Id. at art. II, ¶ 6(a)–(b) (“[T]he Government[s] shall give the fullest considera-
tion to modifying any aspect of the policy [or potential investigation] which has or might
have implications for the United States [or Australia] in relation to the enforcement of its
antitrust laws. In this regard, consideration shall be given to any harm that may be caused
by the implementation or continuation of the Australian policy to the interests protected
by the United States antitrust laws [and vice versa].”).
185. Id. at art. III (“Documents and information provided by either Party in the course
of notification or consultations under this Agreement shall be treated confidentially by the
receiving Party unless the providing Party consents to disclosure or disclosure is compelled
by law.”).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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The mutual notification process makes it mandatory for the agen-
cies to come together, thereby preventing one agency from moving
forward with an investigation or proceeding without first notifying the
other agency. If mere notification is insufficient, the two parties agree
to meet and share confidential information about why they would like
to pursue enforcement of an antitrust violation. This, in practice,
would be a clear example of cooperation. One party decides it wants
to take action that might have implications for the other and informs
that side of its plan. The two parties then mutually decide whether a
consultation is needed. If needed, the two sides meet to compare in-
formation, ideas, and theories. It is this collaborative effort that can
lead to cooperation and a reduction of inconsistent antitrust
penalties.
Critics may argue that this process is unnecessary and time con-
suming. After all, information moves quickly and by requiring the two
parties to meet, fulfilling the requirements of the agreement will turn
into a mere formality that will not be carried out as thoroughly as
intended. However, while this process may be more time consuming
in the beginning, in the end it will give each side a deeper under-
standing of its counterpart’s position. Specifically, by meeting and
conferring about potential antitrust actions, both sides are learning
more about the processes of the other, which will save both parties
time in the long run. The end goal is to move toward cooperating,
learning, and acting in uniformity. This notification and consultation
process actively strives to accomplish all of these goals.
Next, the agreement presents a concrete plan for achieving coop-
eration, which ensures future agency conduct is not left open-en-
ded.189 If the Australian government’s proposed policy is deemed to
be inconsistent with United States antitrust laws, the Australian gov-
ernment may request a written memorialization of the United State’s
conclusions, including explanations.190 Further, after the United
States provides a written memorialization, it must then consider re-
quests for a statement that includes its enforcement intentions.191
However, if after the consultation, there is no means for avoiding a
189. Id.
190. Id. at art. IV, ¶ 1 (“[When the United States] concludes that the implementation
of that policy should not be a basis for action under United States antitrust laws, the Gov-
ernment of Australia may request a written memorialization of such conclusion and the
basis for it. The Government of the United States shall, in the absence of circumstances
making it inappropriate, provide such a written memorialization.”).
191. Id.
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conflict, “each [p]arty shall be free to protect its interests as it deems
necessary.”192
One might argue that this provision gives the parties an easy out
by allowing them to simply claim that there are no means by which to
avoid the conflict. However, such a claim would not be in alignment
with the agreement’s primary purpose. If the two parties are essen-
tially agreeing to cooperate and giving a process by which to do so, it
would seem that one side might only resort to this deems necessary
clause only in the presence of extreme circumstances. It is also worth
mentioning that the deems necessary clause would only be utilized
after all other processes are exhausted. The goal is to increase cooper-
ation by meeting, sharing information, and deciding whether or not
divergent opinions can be avoided. At such a point in the process, the
agencies have already cooperated with each other. Differences of
opinion are bound to arise and the deems necessary clause is included
for such rare situations.
The final relevant provision under the Antitrust Cooperation
Agreement provides that if the consultation results in an amicable res-
olution, and “a proposed investigation or enforcement action under
the antitrust laws of one nation does not adversely affect the laws, poli-
cies or national interests of the other, each Party shall cooperate with
the other in regard to that investigation or action . . .”193 So ulti-
mately, once the parties determine that national laws, policies, or in-
terests would not be affected by pursuing an antitrust action, the two
parties are required to cooperate with each other to ensure efficient
enforcement.
Benefits of the 1982 Antitrust Cooperation Agreement between
the United States and Australia include its emphasis on information
sharing as a result of a commitment to increased cooperation. By pri-
oritizing information sharing, the two countries are moving toward a
situation that facilitates trust. Information sharing is something the
United States has not been able to accomplish with the EU, and this
lack of information sharing often causes undesirable results.194 The
192. Id. at art. IV, ¶ 2.
193. Id. at art. V, ¶ 1.
194. Charles S. Stark, Chief, Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust Division,?U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, Remarks as Prepared for Competition Policy in the Global Trading Sys-
tem:?Perspectives from Japan, the United States, and the European Union: Improving Bi-
lateral Antitrust Cooperation (June 23, 2000), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/
public/speeches/5075.htm (“What the U.S. and the EU lack, however, is the ability to
share evidence they get in their cartel investigations—the kind of cooperation possible
under our MLATs, or under the U.S.-Australia IAEAA agreement. As a consequence it is
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US-Australian Antitrust Cooperation Agreement has proven to be
quite successful195 and has even set the framework for future agree-
ments such as the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance
Act196—an act that both the United States and Australia agreed upon
and signed in 1999—which further expands antitrust cooperation be-
tween the two countries.197 In fact, the United States has indicated its
desire for more jurisdictions to follow suit by using the template set
forth above, as well as its desire to enter into more cooperation
agreements.198
Conclusion
There currently are significant differences between United States
Antitrust and European Union Competition laws, which have ques-
tionable effects on modern technology companies such as Microsoft,
Google, and Facebook. However, the first step in eliminating the in-
consistent enforcement of these different bodies of law is to create an
environment that fosters substantial cooperation between antitrust en-
forcement agencies.
While the principles set forth by this Comment will surely not be
the end-all to the problem of duplicative—or possibly inconsistent—
enforcement of antitrust law, taking these steps will help to move en-
forcement agencies toward a more cooperative global body of interna-
tional antitrust law. Ultimately, using these tools will create an
environment that fosters business development, while continuing to
limit conduct that may be anti-competitive in a more consistent and
efficient way.
not possible, for example, for the U.S. and the Commission to coordinate searches in inter-
national cartel cases and pool the evidence obtained by our respective efforts—something
that would enhance both jurisdictions’ anticartel efforts.”).
195. See Press Release, Embassy of the U.S., Attorney General Signs Antitrust Assistance
Agreement with Australia (Apr. 29, 1999), available at http://usrsaustralia.state.gov/us-oz/
1999/04/27/doj1.html (“Australia is an important U.S. trading and investment partner.
Two-way trade increased significantly in 1998, to a total of more than $18 billion, and U.S.
foreign direct investment in Australia currently exceeds $26 billion. The new [1999] agree-
ment builds on a U.S.-Australia antitrust cooperation agreement signed in 1982, and on a
close relationship that has developed over the years between the Department, the Federal
Trade Commission, and the Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (ACCC).”).
196. Id.
197. See id.
198. Id.
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